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1. Introduction
There are traditionally two major views of the relationship between power 
and wealth in the foreign policies of nation-states* The mercantilist view 
places the state at the center of analysis, and the pursuit of power in its 
various forms is held to be the main goal of the state* Wealth is but another 
form of power. It is a prerequisite for most other forms of power, and is 
most effective when used in conjunction with the other forms* As a form of 
power» wealth is useful in Itself» and the competition to gain it is also a 
contest of power* The classical liberal view regards the individual as the 
center of analysis* The pursuit of wealth is the central goal of individuals* 
The state provides a few Important services such as defense, the enforcement 
of contracts, and the maintenance of orderly markets, but otherwise interferes 
as little as possible with individual freedom* Free trade is the ideal in the 
international as well as the domestic economy. Power is an evil that inter­
feres with the pursuit of wealth, and it can be eliminated with free market 
institutions* Free markets enhance international peace as well as domestic 
peace*
It is this assumption of a natural harmony of Interests that makes the 
liberal doctrine so out of touch with reality* A growing body of literature 
has begun to challenge the neoclassical assumption of a natural harmony of 
interests and its insistence that power has no place in the study of econo­
mics* E* H. Carr long ago demonstrated that the liberal doctrine of a nat­
ural harmony of interests was merely special interest by another name*1 
This should be self evident when we remember that the central economic ques­
tion is the allocation of scarce rasources among alternate usee. If resources
2
3are scarce> whoever possesses more has a greater ability to achieve goals9 
and therefore greater power# Wealth itself is a form of power» and it is 
exercised through market institutions#
The thesis of this paper is that the general mercantilist conception of 
the relation baleen wealth and power is still valid today# This conception 
can be adapted to analyse the relationship between economic power and polit­
ical power in the current international system#
2. The Liberal View
Originsmmmmmmmtmmmmrnmm
The idea that economic questions should be separated from political 
questions originated around 1800 with the classical school of economics.
The thesis of the liberal doctrine is that economic power does not exist in 
a capitalist market economy* either on the national or International scale* 
as long as governments proscribe monopolies. There is a natural harmony of 
Interests. This holds true in a liberal international trading economy as 
well as in a domestic one. Deviations from free markets will hurt the inati- 
gators as much as the Intended target. The liberal doctrine originated with 
Adam Smith's assertion that the pursuit of Individual self interest by all 
people in society would result in mutual gain* for everybody through the in­
visible hand of the market. Thus* the evils of power politics would be banned 
from domestic society. Public welfare would be maximised by a free enter­
prise system, untalned by power or conflict. Capitalist society would uphold 
Individual freedom* which Hill saw as the paramount political value. The role 
of governments would be limited to the maintenance of orderly markets* enforce­
ment contracts, and defense of the state.
It was hoped that these ideas could be extended to the international 
sphere. War* the liberals was believed* was caused by states that persisted 
in seeing their primary* if not only* goals as being the maximisation of power. 
The pursuit of this power could only lead to foreign military adventures which 
would have to be paid for by taxes* which would only lower wealth. Richard 
Cobden was a leading proponent of the idea that Increasing Interdependence
4
through trad* would load to graatar peace and harmony aaong states. although 
this achool waa not ao aiapllatic as to baliava a llbaral system would be a 
sufficient condition to and all war fid bring perpetual paaca.
The post 1943 world systaa can be aeen as divided into two economic 
blocs* the liberal Western bloc and the communist Eastern bloc. Most econ­
omists probably would not deny the existence of economic power in relations 
between the two bloca. The Heat hee elwaya restricted trade to prevent the 
Sovieta from gaining access to military technology. The Western system* how­
ever* was to be a liberal one* analysed with traditional economic models* in 
which economic power in theory was banned by assumption. Charles Kindleberger's 
Power and Money is a welcome exception to this trend* but his elementary clas­
sification lacks a systematic framework for analysing between the different 
instruments of power and their relationship to different goals.
Indeed* postwar Amerioan policymakers were remarkably successful in cre­
ating an international economy that was generally open to penetration by 
American and European multinational corporations* assured US Access to world 
markets* and that generally replaced the discriminatory system of imperial 
preferences with a multilateral and less discriminatory system* and replaced 
sterling and. other currencies with the dollar as the main reserve currency.
While the policies and public Justifications were liberal* the intent 
aod effect were warcantilistic in the sense that the new system was designed 
<M^af^e'^^t^ir«fitic* , The fact that others also benefited was not an aeei- 
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6prosperity and to •orvo «• counterweights to the Soviet Union. Critics of 
liberalism were right to point out that its primary beneficiary would ba the 
dominant economic power. They were wrong, however, to imply that others 
would not receive any benefits from liberalism.
A Recent Interpretation
The persistent flaw permeating classical liberal thought and its de­
rivatives is the failure to recognise the existence of power relationships 
within economic relations, and more Importantly, the importance of military 
and political power in maintaining economic institutions.
Richard Rosencrance represents the one of the latest reincarnations of 
the liberal hope. He tries to build a "duallstlc" approach to international 
relations, dividing states into the "military-political world" and the "trad­
ing world." The former "rely primarily on military force and only incidentally 
engage in trade," which is "an economic palliative between the territorial 
wars that truly determine a nation's fate." The latter "make their liveli­
hood in trade and use defense only against the most remote contingencies • . • 
trade and internal development are primary and defense a tectlcal measure to 
reduce another state's temptation to strike."3 His hope is that the old clas­
sical liberal world can still be achieved} "the main thesis of this book is 
that a new "trading world" of International relations offers the possibility 
of escaping such a vicious cycle [of conflict} end finding new patterns of 
cooperation among nation states. Indeed, it suggests that the benefit of 
trade and cooperationtoday greatly exceeds that of military competition 
and territorial aifrnirtlaansht."*,, A main fsatura that dlstlagnisMs Rosocranoe
7from his Cobdenlte predecessors is a greater realism regarding the prospects 
that a "trading world" will come about. He recognises the pressures that 
induce states to follow a "military-political" strategy will continue to 
exist for a long time to come. Yet he is still optimistic that world con­
ditions are making a trading strategy more and more attractive.
Rosecrance has two contradictory descriptions of the trading strategy.
He describes a trading world as offering the possibility of escaping the 
vicious cycle of war and "finding new patterns of cooperation among nation­
states."^ Yet he describes the trading strategy» using "mechanisms of in­
dustrial-technological development and international trade/1 as a way that 
"nations can transform their positions in international politics . • • 
while other states also benefit from the enhanced trade and growth that 
economic cooperation makes possible."* The phrase "position in international 
politics" cannot be anything but a euphemism for power, whether Rosecrance 
realised it or not. Position, moreover implies relativity —  one country 
gains a more powerful position only in comparison with another. Other coun­
tries may certainly benefit from enhanced trade and growth* but all countries 
will not benefit at the same rate. If there is anything constant about cap­
italism* it is that relative growth rates of countries are always uneven and 
changing.
The idea that power is negligible if not entirely absent from economic 
relations* and the derivative notion that economics embodies cooperation 
and politics embodies strife, are typical of liberal thinking and permeate 
Rosecrancevs analysis* To most* it should be self-evident that politics 
can embody cooperation in the form of alliances against a common enemy, and
8IP
economics can embody strife as exemplified in trade wars and Western domina­
tion of the IMF to ensure their own control over international finance.
Rosecrance's idea that "the theory of international exchange and trade 
gives a basis for mutual cooperation and mutual benefit"? is but another 
version of the doctrine of a natural .raony of interests» and the failure 
to see power relationships in economics.
This is closely related to Rosecrance's subscription to the Peace 
through Trade fallacy: "If national policies of economic growth depend upon
an expanding world market» one country can hardly expect to rely primarily upon 
territorial aggression and aggrandisement. To attack onefs best customers is 
to undermine the commercial faith and reciprocity in which exchange takes 
plac." Rosacranca explains that a lack of lnterpendanca la tha main raaaon 
why "world history la mainly a narrative of territorial and military expansion 
[and] unandlng war."^
This Is simply not true. Hitler was highly dependant on ths Soviet Union 
for natural resources before he Invaded in 1941. In the 1930's Japan was busy 
conquering its main Aslan trading partners, and it launched a surprise attack 
on one of Its major oil suppliers on December 7, 1941. Nicaraqua continues to 
antagonise the US despite sanctions which have proved extremely costly for 
Nicaraqua. Cuba has accepted the enormous loss of economic opportunities re­
sulting from their failure to come to terms with tha US. The black African 
states long supported a guerrilla campaign against the South African govern­
ment. Destruction of economic infrastructure is a favorite tactic of the 
Salvadoran guerrillas. One of the lessons here is that there are different 
degrees of dependence. Moreover, weak states can gain powerful benefactors.
' ■ y  :y  y  ■V" ';-y' '■•yyy|
9Also, a country with a sufficient military advantage can occupy its trading 
partner by force.
Here is another example of his failure to see power Inherent in econ­
omics: "If the Soviet Union would modify its past territorial orientations
and adopt reliable policies of exchange and trade with other nations» the 
prospects for peace in the last years of the twentieth century would be 
greatly enhanced.11*^
This exposes another fallacy —  the idea that peace is the absence of 
war. Under this definition, the Arab Israeli dispute could be ended to­
morrow if all of the Jews willingly left Palestine. The US-Nicaraguan con­
flict would end tomorrow if the Sandlnlstae voluntarily relinquished power. 
There would be peace in South Africa tomorrow if the blacks quietly ac- 
c.pt.d th.ir a.cond cl... etatua. Tha U8 Sovl.t conflict could bo and.d to­
morrow if tha U8 gov.rna.nt) with tha aupport of lta paoplat gava tha Soviet 
politburo aov.r.ign authority to aak. law. in th. US. Real paaoa r.qulr.a, 
in addition to an abaanco of war, that th. aain intar.ata of all th. partl.a 
in a conflict bo uphold. Thaaa axaaplaa ahould b. aufflci.nt to illuatrat. 
that tha notion of paaeo aa th. abaanco of war ia elaply out of touch with 
reality.
Roa.cranc. ...a Japan and Waat Germany at tha cantor of tha trading aya- 
t.n. "today," Roa.cranc. not.a. "Waat Germany and Japan ua. International 
trade to acquire tha vary raw aat.rlale and oil that they aimed to conqu.r by 
military force in tha 1930*0. they have proaparad in peaceful conaequenc."*1 
Roe.crance argua. that Japan would-never follow th. US nodal and become tha
io
world's biggest military and naval power. Instead, the US (hopefully, in his 
opinion) might follow the Japanese model.^ This falls to recognise that 
the only reason Japan can pursue this strategy is because of the American se- 
curlty umbrella. Were it withdrawn and/or US markets closed to Japanese pro­
ducts, Japan would have to become a military power, and possibly return to a 
policy similar to the Greater Bast Aslan Co-Prosperity Sphere involving mili­
tary force to ensure access to markets and raw materials. Rostcrance's work 
is permeated by the failure to see that military power is necessary to uphold 
economic power.
Rosccrance's assertion that after 1945 "large-scale territorial expan­
sion began to evolve as too costly —  too dangerous and too uncertain as a 
general strategy of national advancement"^ is undermined by the examples 
of the wars between Vietnam and Cambodia, Ethiopia and Somalia, Libya and Chad 
Iran and Iraq, the Soviet Union Afghanistan, the Sahara War, the India-Chlna 
War, and the Indo-Paklstanl wars.
By concentrating on relations between Roseerance misses the fact that
*»
much conflict con.i.t* of civil vare, not int.r.t.t. vara.
Roaacrance a.a.rta "tha attempt to aaxlaiae both trading and military- 
political poaaibiliti.a haa failed throughout hiatory, and, ainca Rom., hege­
mony haa never bean won by any etate, ■ Thia analyeit haa two waaknaaaaa. 
Hia atateaent ia true enough for world hegemony» but there have been a number 
of relatively repent regional h.gaaona, auch aa the US in the Heatevn Hernia- 
phera, the Soviet Union in Eaat Europe» South Africa in aouthern Africa* 
Vietnam in Xndoehlna. India la feat becoming , regional hegemon in South
11
Asia.1  ^ Somewhat more distant historical examples Include the building of 
modern nation atates9 such as the Prussian domination of Germany In the nine­
teenth century• A more important problem for Rosecrance is the failure of the 
aspiring "world" hegemons such as Napoleon &nd Hitler was due to the opposing 
military power of their opponents. Furthermore! the conquests they were able 
to make were made possible by the fact that their opponents failed to build 
up sufficient military strength to protect themselves. France would have 
been just as badly off or even weaker had it pursued a "trading" strategy in 
1914 and 1939 instead of a military strategy.
Rosecrance [qualifies his argument by noting] that "if most states were 
to rely exclusively on trading methods9 the few that specialised in military 
and territorial expansion would make great gains at the former's expense.
i
. . . Th. 41ffar.no. between at.t.a 1. that i o m  r.ly primarily on alllt.ry 
foro. and only Incidentally engage in tradai other, make th.lr livelihood in 
trad, and u.. dafana. only againat th. m a t  raaota contlng.nclaa. For th. 
firet, trad, la an economic palliative between th. territorial ware that truly 
determine a nation', fate; for the second, trade and internal development ar. 
primary and defenae a tactical maaaura to reduce another', temptation to 
etrike."*” Thie, however• atill a.ema too aimpllatic. It etlll ignore, th. 
fact that a trading eyatem requires eon. military-political equilibrium such aa 
the Concert of Furope, Pax Britannic, or Par Americana, or aome other ayetem 
which more or l.aa aaaur.a th. territorial and political integrity of at laaat 
the major atetea in the ayatam. Otharwiae the etruggl. for eaeurlty would 
domluate the energies of the atatea, and the eyatem could evolve into a ayetem 
of Mlf-aufficient trading blooa aa wue becoming the patt.rn in the y.ara 
prior to World War IX. A better theory would outline the poealble situations
4 *
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Asia**’'* Somewhat more distant historical examples Include the building of 
modern nation states» such as the Prussian domination of Germany in the nine­
teenth century# A more important problem for Rosecrance is the failure of the 
aspiring "world" hegemons such as Napoleon and Hitler was due to the opposing 
military power of their opponents# Furthermore, the conquests they were able 
to make were made possible by the fact that their opponents failed to build 
up sufficient military strength to protect themselves# France would have 
been just as badly off or even weaker had it pursued a "trading" strategy in 
1914 and 1939 instead of a military strategy#
Rosacrance [qualifies his argument by noting] that "if moat atatas war# 
to raly exclusively on trading sethoda, the few that specialised in military 
and territorial expansion would make great gains at tha former's expense.
. '. .The difference between states is that some rely primarily on military 
force and only incidentally engage in trade» others make their livelihood in 
trad* and use defense only against the most rsmote contingencies. Forth# 
first* trade is an economic palliative between the territorial wars that truly 
detemln* a nation's fatet for ths second, trade and Internal development are 
primary and defense a tactical maaeure to reduce another's temptation to 
strike."16 This, however, still seam* too simplistic. It still ignore* the 
fact that a trading system requires corns military-political equilibrium such as 
the Concert of Europe, Pax Britannic* or Pax American*, or some other system 
which more or las* assures the territorial and political integrity of at least 
the major states in the system. Otherwise the struggle for security would 
dominate the energies of the states, and the system could evolve lnt^ a system
of self-sufficient trading blocs ** was beeomlng the pattern in the year* - 
Ftlm to ttM14 H.r u .  » b .« .r  * « ,  m u  M U .  u» » o » m . U u ttM .
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a country might find itself in and auggaat the proper mix between the trading 
etrategy and the military-political strategy. Hie qualification of his argu­
ment in this manner does raise the degree of realism* but it also undercuts 
his argument that the nations of the "Third World"17 more than others "are 
faced with a choice between fighting and trading because they cannot afford 
to do both"1** when he allows that all states combine both strategies at least 
to a degree.
3* The Mercantilist View
The idea that wealth and power are but two sides of the same coin is 
probably as old as wealth itself. Embodied in the provision of weapons and 
logistical support for fleets and armies* wealth has always been in Integral 
part of political power. The mercantilist theories of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries only adapted these ideas to the circumstances of the 
new and rising nation-states of the period. Jacob Vlner* disputing the 
stereotype of mercantilism as subordinating the goal of wealth to the central 
goal of power [neatly contrasting the opposite liberal view that power should 
be subordinated to plenty]* enumerates the four principles of mercantilisms
1. Wealth is an absolutely essential means to power* whether for 
security or for aggression;
2. Power is essential or valuable as a means to the acquisition or 
retention of wealth;
3. Wealth and power are each proper ultimate ends of national policy;
4* There is a long run harmony between these ends* although in partic­
ular circumstances it may be necessary for a time to make economic sac­
rifices in the interest of military security and therefore also of long- 
run prosperity.^
The first two propositions are concerned with means* and the second two pro­
positions are concerned with ends*
These ideas have been at the root of the foreign policies of all the 
Orest Powers since the early days of the nation-state. They formed the basis 
lor the ) M #  for hegemony by Philip II* Colbert# Imperial Germany* Hitler’s
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Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union. They also formed the basis 
for Britain’s victory in the long struggle to prevent French domination of 
the continent, culminating in the Grand Coalition against Napoleon, as well 
as its attempt to salvage its declining economic position in the 1930's.
The common view fostered by conventional economics that mercantilism is 
merely a set of protectionist policy prescriptions is no more than an incom- 
plete and misleading caricature. This picture refers to a set of policies 
appropriate to a time when the international system was very different. 
Countries now have more sophisticated policies to advance national economic 
Interests such as subsidies, favorable credit terms, and other policy instru­
ments. The German economist Friedrich List explained how free trade policies 
benefited the strong at the expense of the w e a k .2® Free trade, then, would 
be pursued by a mercantilist state as long as free trade served its interests. 
The US and Great Britain are the classic examples. Mercantilism is a set of 
ideas regarding the relation between wealth, power, and the state.
Mahan's work on the importance of sea power was firmly grounded in the 
unity of wealth and power. Underlying the entire work is the presumption 
that wealth is the foundation of power: "The profound influence of sea com­
merce upon the wealth and strength of countries was clearly seen long before 
the true principles which governed its growth and prosperity were detected." 
Moreover, restrictive policies were needed "to secure to one's own people a 
disproportionate share of such benefits,"21 Mahan viewed overseas trade as 
the most critical form of wealth, and it followed that sea power was necessary 
to protect this wealth and the transportation network on which it depended.
Sea power, in turn, was dependent on the economic base and corresponding
15
infrastructure to sustain it.22
Halford Mackinder would have agreed with Mahan’s implicit assumptions 
regarding the assumption that wealth is the foundation of power. The dif­
ference is that Mackinder believed that the ultimate beneficiaries of the 
new technologies would not be the maritime powers but the great land powers 
which would be opened by railroads.23
While the realist tradition in international relations that developed 
in the US after World War II kept the state and the concept of power at the 
center of analysis, economic power and the notion of wealth as the foundation 
of other instruments of power became obscured. Power was primarily identi­
fied with military strength. The fact that military power depended on a 
strong industrial base was recognized as an assumption but the problem was 
not widely analyzed. It is only recently that this has been a major subject 
fcr discussion and worry in the United States.24 it was assumed that US mili­
tary dominance would ensure that it would retain its influence over other 
facets of international politics. Power was assumed to be rolatlvely fungible. 
The fact that the US economic dominance of the world seemed so overwhelming 
and permanent, and the assumption that economic problems would take care of 
themselves under free trade abroad and Keynslan demand management at home,
t
probably contributed a great deal to this omission. The attempt to imitate the 
discipline of economics and create the nation-state equivalent of economic man 
resulted in a state whose goal was the maximization of power, just as the 
individual's goal was to maximize utility of consumption.
Cline takes this assumption that power is fungible and can be aggregated
16
to Its limits, and constructs an aggregative index of power. Unlike the tra­
ditional analysis, it has the merit of considering a wide range of economic 
and other factors along with military power.25 if.g greatest weakness lies 
in its greatest strength, however. Baldwin notes that Cline's work repre­
sents ,,the polar opposite of the type of contextual analysis advocated by the 
Sprouts and Lasswell and K a p l a n . S i n c e  it does not analyze power in spe­
cific contexts, it will be subject to what Baldwin calls the “paradox of un­
realized power'1 i How the weak manage to influence the strong,27
Cline is to be commended for recognizing that strategy and will are in­
tegral to the problem of the analysis of power. His methodology and conclu­
sions, however, leave much to be desired. He defines strategy at the national 
level as "the part of the political decision-making process that conceptualizes 
and establishes goals and objectives designed to p otect and enhance national 
interests in the international environment." National will is "the degree 
of resolve that can be mobilized among the citizens of a nation in support 
of governmental decisions above defense and foreign policy."2® No quarrel can 
be made with these definitions. His conclusion that US policy has been con­
fused and awkward since the mid 1960's is debatable, Although it contains a 
degree of truth. Yet it is even more invalid to postulate an aggregate of co­
herence of strategy than an general aggregate of power. Coherence of strategy 
and ability to build a consensus around policy seems to be highly dependent 
on context. It is true the US was unable to maintain a consensus on Vietnam. 
Yet over the long run, there has emerged a consensus for other policies such 
as arms control and Individual military operations such as Grenada and the 
Libyan bombing. Cline also falls to recognize that changing international
17
circumstances and power relationships and the fact that the impact of these 
changes is often unclear will necessarily require a reevaluation of interests 
and strategy, over which there might be legitimate disagreement. In the case 
of a clear cut confrontation with the Soviet Union, which is probably the only 
context in which such an aggregate measure of power might have some degree of 
utility, it is likely that a sense of national emergency would produce a 
higher degree of coherence and support for government policy. Moreover, the 
implicit Soviet Aggression in such a conflict might undermine the Soviet’s 
ability to mobilize the public opinion. The strategic coherence problem 
could be the result of a perceived ambiguity of Soviet intentions which pro­
duces different policy recommendations, rather than a fundamental incoherence.
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circumstances and power relationships and the fact that the impact of these 
changes is often unclear will necessarily require a reevaluation of Interests 
and strategy» over which there might be legitimate disagreement* In the case 
of a clear cut confrontation with the Soviet Union, which is probably the only 
context in which such an aggregate measure of power might have some degree of 
utility, it is likely that a sense of national emergency would produce a 
higher degree of coherence and support for government policy. Moreover, the 
implicit Soviet Aggression in such a conflict might undermine the Soviet's 
ability to mobilize the public opinion. The strategic coherence problem 
could be the result of a perceived ambiguity of Soviet intentions which pro­
duces different policy recommendations, rather than a fundamental Incoherence.
4. A Framework For The Analysis of Power
The general theoretical conception of the relation between wealth, power, 
and the state as ascribed to the mercantilists by Vlner seems as appropriate 
today as It was In the Seventeenth century. What Is needed Is to reformulate 
the propositions In terms of today's International system, and update the pol­
icy prescriptions to include tools currently in use by governments. This 
paper will, however, concentrate on reformulating the propositions, not on 
the policy prescriptions for specific circumstances.
The absence of a satisfactory definition of power has been a major problem 
hindering the ability to adequately analyze the interrelationship between its 
economic and political components. The conventional definition of power as 
the ability of A to get B to do something he otherwise would not do, or some 
variation of this, seems too restrictive and difficult to operationalize for 
the purpose of studying economic power and the economic foundations of other 
types of power. David Baldwin enumerates some conclusions of recent syste­
matic studies on power, including power as a relational concept, the importance 
of positive as well as negative sanctions, that "power may rest on various 
basis, and no one form of power is basic to all the others," and the multi- 
dimensionality of power.29 He also sees some major shortcomings in recent 
studies on power. There is "the tendency to exaggerate the fungibillty of 
power resources • . • the propensity to treat military power resources as the 
'ultimate' power base • • . and • • • emphasis on conflict and negative sanc­
tions."^ Baldwin advocates greater emphasis on context.31
It seems to me that we can define the broader concept of power as
18
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comprising three essential elements, while considering economic power a sub* 
set of these elements* This advantage of this definition is that it allows 
us to operationalize the analysis of economic power*
1* Ends: Individuals or groups attempt to Influence outcomes in a
social context* In this sense, power is the ability to achieve a goal* This 
can be with or against the will of others. Power is enhanced in the sense that 
the goal is achieved whether as a result of voluntary cooperation by the other 
party (if that party also found the goal to be in its interest] or through 
opposing another party. If everybody shares the same goals and Interests, 
power will be a positive sum game. If goals and interests conflict, somebody 
either will lose, or will gain less. Power can be n zero sum or small sum 
game* Since the function of the economy is to allocate scarce resources among 
alternative uses, it is not necessarily a positive sum game. Certainly every­
body may benefit to some degree, but some clearly benefit more than others, 
and what goes to one country is not available for another. Economic power is 
largely a function of inequality.
2. Means: The achievement of goals requires the use of instruments,
tools, or resources. Weapons are the first example that comes to mind. Pro­
paganda and manipulation of opinion are also important. For this paper, 
attention will be concentrated on economic resources such as money, the means 
of production, and natural resources. Time should also be considered, either 
in this category or in the next.
3. Medium: The utility of any purtcular instrument of power depends
on the context in which it is to be used. Tanks are not useful on water, and
20
ships are not useful on land. State power can be exercised through interna­
tional organizations such as the NATO, the UN or the World Bank. In the 
economic arena, context is manifested ir the various ways that market insti­
tutions are structured. In other words, the political arena determines the 
parameters of market behavior. National monetary and fiscal policies have a 
large Impact on the economic climate. The Western industrial countries have 
much Influence over the debt and deficit adjustment processes in developing 
nations through their domination of the IMF.
5. Unit of Analysis; The State
Susan Strange, among others, critizes the state centric nature of much 
of the analysis of power which leads to an "Inevitable logic that limits all 
subsequent analysis to the conscious use of economic weapons by governments 
In relations with other governments."32 This leads to an interpretation 
economic power "almost exclusively in the capacity either to coerce other 
states [aggressive economic power] or to defend the state against coercion 
by others [defensive economic power]."33 This in turn implies acceptance of 
"the neoclassical assumption that power is unimportant in the politically 
vital key issue-areas of international investment, trade, and money." The 
result is to exclude from the analysis any exercise of market power that is 
not deliberately undertaken to weaken or coerce other states but only to secure 
income gains. Strange considers Klaus Knorr's work Power and Wealth to be a 
particularly egregious example of this variety of analysis.34
Strange suggests that "the greatest threat to the automony and integrity 
of states —  for some states and at some times —  may be, not the threat of 
external aggression by another state, but the subtle, silent, and Insidious 
permeation of national societies by transnational actors," and credits writers 
like Hye and Keohane, Bergsten, Kaiser, Camps, Dlebold, Calleo, Schmitt, and 
others for moving political analysis In this direction.35
The analysis presented here agrees with Strange's contentions that the 
analysis of power must go beyond coercion and must reject the neoclassical 
assumption that power is absent from economic relations. States certainly are 
vulnerable to some extent to transnational actors. Yet the state remalno the
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fundamental political unit in the international system. It is the unit which 
most people expect to give them identity and maintain their interests with 
respect to the rest of the world. Only states have sovereignty, and they are 
the basic unit of policy. Corporations are subject in the final analysis to 
the political jurisdiction of states, and they do not command physical 
coercive power. International organizations such as the IMF, World Bank, and 
the UN are also subject to the control and influence by groups of governments. 
The primacy of states is not altered by the fact that these organizations 
impinge on the sovereignty of some countries because the decisions of these 
international organizations are made by a coalition of other governments.
It is better to see these international organizations not as transnational 
actors in their own right but as political structures by which some states 
can influence the behavior of other states through coalitions with other 
like-minded states and through manipulations of the rules and structure of the 
organization.
The State is also the focus of nationalism and national ambitions, which 
seem as potent as ever. In the US, this is reflected in the recent spate of 
literature lamenting the decline in American relative power, ^  and protec­
tionist pressures in Congress directed against Japan. In Japan, nationalism 
has been reflected in their strategy to attain economic leadership and directed 
by the senior bureaucrats and industrialists who fashion Japan's competitive 
economic strategy. The potency of nationalism is also evident in most regional 
disputes, including South Korea and North Korea, Thailand and Vietnam, India 
and Pakistan, Israel and the Arabs, and Nicaragua and the United States. 
Nationalism is also evident within countries, the the Basques, the Kurds, and
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the Tamils as only a few examples.
For these reasons this paper will concentrate on power from the perspec­
tive of the state.
6* Goals and Interests
The boundaries between the three elements in power are not always stric­
tly defined, for the accumulation of the various instruments, to the extent 
that they can be accumulated, will always be intermediate goals of states.
Most states build a stock of weapons and maintain standing armies. It has 
been generally established that one of the primary goals of states in modern 
times is the increased provision of economic prosperity to its citizens.
This has been especially true in the industrialized West. Viner's distill­
ation of mercantilist thought is stillvalid today: wealth and power are
each proper ultimate ends of national policy, and there is a long run harmony 
between these ends, although sometimes It is necessary to sacrifice one for 
the other.
In terras of goals, W. W. Rostow, reviewing Kennedyfs Rise and Fall of the 
Great Powers, divides states into two categories: those pursuing a hegemonic
strategy or a balance of power policy. ^  These two orientations can be com­
bined, depending on the circumstances. A country such as India can be a he- 
gomonic power in a regional sense while pursuing a balance of power policy 
toward the rest of the world*3® Vietnam for a while also had ambitions of 
becoming a regional power> Most small countries, however, do not have the 
option of choosing a hegemonic policy and must either latch themselves onto a 
bigger power that may or may not have hegemonic ambitions, or attempt to play 
the big powers off against each other while retaining their own freedom of 
action.
The pursuit of wealth Itself is the major economic goal of states in
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order to increase consumption utility for its citizens, to gain more of the 
economic instruments of power, and to advance its non-economic interest in 
the international area. Membership in a market system given economic 
power [Influence over outcomes] within the market that is denied to those 
not allowed to participate, or whose participation is restricted. Those who 
can influence the rules by which the market operates or its instituional 
structures, or who beneift from the rules or structures have economic 
power. Product characteristics and conditions of product use, [e. g. perish­
ability of foods] also given economic power to one or both sides of a trans­
action [if there are multiple conditions] regardless of whether they are 
inherent or susceptible to alteration by innovation. Finally, there are two 
things traded on markets, money and goods or services. There will be a 
positive relationship between a market participant's control over money 
[claims to wealth] and the means of production.
The optimum combination of wealth and power at a given time will depend 
on whether a country has hegemonic ambitions and, if a country does have 
ambitions, the combination will also depend on its strategy. It will also 
depend on whether it perceives hegemonic ambitions on the part of others in 
a position to threaten its interests. The US has maintained a certain level 
of armaments it thought necessary to contain the perceived Soviet threat.
The question of timing is critical. While economic power is more 
fungible than military power, military power can be used immediately while 
time is needed to convert wealth [Instruments of economic power] to military 
equipment. In the short run, Germany and Japan won important military
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victories, but these were not sufficient to nullify the long run economic 
advantage of the allies. In guerrilla wars, military power is weaker. The 
ability of the other superpower to economically support the war efforts 
of the Afghan and Vietnamese guerrillas contributed to the defeat of the 
standing regimes. Military power might win quick victories, but economic 
help that could be converted to military power was available and capable of 
being utilized in the long term. In the case of El Salvador, the standing 
regime was more successful.
The timing is even more critical when the problem is a shortage of 
economic resources needed for conversion to military instruemnts, as was 
the case of Britain in the two World Wars. When the US entered World War I 
and granted a loan to Britain in 1917, the British had "perhaps no m 
than a months funds in hand for transatlantic dealings."^ The British 
position was worse in World War II. Rearmament in the late 1930*8 had to be 
delayed until the last possible moment. "If Britain rearmed too precipi­
tately she might lack the economic strength to carry a war through to a 
successful conclusion; she might even be struck by an economic crises be­
fore a hypothetical war occurred, with fatal consequences to her foreign 
standing and to stability at home. There could be unpleasant economic con­
sequences even if the defense programme successfully deterred Germany."^
The timing of Hitler's invasion of Russia was determined in part by the cal­
culation that Russia had to be Invaded before it built up its army and its 
economy. Indeed, the timing of the start of Hitler's campaign in the West was 
in part motivated by the fear that Germany needed to strike before her rivals 
grew too strong.
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During a time when a threat is not imminent* the level of armaments 
can be kept to low levels by a balance of power state. For example* a part 
of the US troops earmarked for NATO are stationed in the US while their 
equipment is stockpiled in Europe as a cost saving measure in peacetime.
NATO only has a few weeks worth of supplies and ammunition. During a crisis 
when war seemed possible* preparations could be made for converting more 
economic resources into military resources.
The strategy of waiting to build up military forces while building up 
the economic capacity to produce them* however* is also a strategy that can 
be employed by hegemonic powers. Alan S. Milward atgues that the popular 
perception that the German economy in the late 1930's was completely geared 
for war is simply wrong. Worried about domestic position* Hitler wanted 
the economy to be designed for short wars while maintaining the level of 
civilian consumption. "The files of the office of the Berlin President of 
Police were well stocked with fearful anticipations of the political unrest 
that would be caused by the negligible hardships of Germany's capital invest­
ment program."4* As Milward puts it* Hitler wanted "guns and butter."^2 
The idea of the Blltzkrelg was of a series of short wars geared to short 
but intensive bursts of economic effort. Given a situation in which only 
a certain unchanging sector of the economy was consecrated to war production 
purposes it would be necessary to change the composition of the output of 
this sector according to the war to be fought. The attack on France was 
preceded by an abnormally heavy production of vehicles and mobile armour* that 
on Britain by an Increased production of naval equipment and aeroplanes. The 
attack on Russia was preceded by an all-out production effort in the field
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of general army equipment. None of these increases in output involved an 
overall increase in the output of that sector of the economy committed to war 
production. Each increase was achieved by throttling back into other, no 
longer wanted, branches of armaments production."^ The allies were thus 
surprised by the increase in German war production after 1942 when the German 
economy became mobilized for total war.
The ease with which economic resources can be converted to military re­
sources is also critical, and this will have some bearing on the optimum 
balance between wealth and armaments. An extended discussion of this pro­
blem, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. ^
i
.a
7. Instruments and Context
Any Instrument of power has some quality which allows It to be used to 
attain a goal. The instruments of power available to the nation-state can be 
classified Into six main categoriest Wealth, military, quantity of population 
geography, leadership, and domestic cohesion. These roughly correspond with 
the main elements discerned by Cline, but there are differences in definition. 
Domestic cohesion is much more than the willingness to support foreign policy. 
It also includes the popular perception of the regime's legitimacy. Serious 
disagreement on the legitimate norms of domestic political can easily lead to 
civil war as demonstrated by South Africa, Iran, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. 
Afghanistan will join this list when the Soviets leave. This also greatly 
weakens a country's foreign policy. Diplomatic skill should be included un­
der strategy. Clever diplomacy can in certain circumstances make up for weak­
nesses in other areas, whereas clumsy bargaining can undermine a strong 
position.
Institutions and frameworks are critical elements that Cline and others 
leave out when enumerating the components of military and economic power. 
Alliances are a critical component of military strength. A country with other 
levers of influence can use the institutions of the alliance to redistribute 
costs and benefits. The US is considering using its influence in NATO to 
force the Europeans to bear ,a greater share of the economic cost. The Soviet 
Union uses the Warsaw Pact alliance as much to maintain its control over East 
Europe and give it an excuse for maintaining troops there as it does to defend 
against NATO.
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Likewise, economic institutions and market parameters are an important 
part of economic power* Money and its regulation by national central banks 
and the IMF help determine the availability of credit* GATT is a forum for 
trade negotiations* The OPEC cartel exercise some Influence over the oil 
market. The slopes of demand and supply curves can give entities varying 
degrees of economic power*
The fuzziness of the boundaries between the categories extends to the 
second two elements of power,, means and medium. Raw Instruments such as 
money, productive capacity, or weapons can be used to create institutional 
frameworks* Institutional frameworks can in turn be manipulated to alter the 
production or distribution of raw Instruments, especially of the economic 
variety.
Military Instruments and Context
This paper is not concerned with developing an index of military power 
or a comprehensive analysis of all of the different contexts in which may 
affect the utility of the various different military instruments of power. 
Instead, the object is to examine how general military power interacts with 
the economic instruments to maintain overall state power*
It is instructive that Rosecranctfs "historic hegemonic pretenders" 
[Philip II, Louis XIV, and Napoleon] correspond to whose who tried to imple­
ment a hybrid strategy combining the trading and military-political strate­
gies* 45 Britain, he says came close to establishing a "lesser version" by 
avoiding continental military commitments* Yet, this commercial dominance 
cema *fter Britain had defeated its French contender militarily, established
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Its navy as the supreme arbiter of the high seas, and established the Concert 
of Europe to restrain France and smooth European diplomatic problems with a 
minimum expenditure of British effort.
The Important thing military power has done for Britain and the US, the 
latest two dominant powers, was to provide a political framework under which 
normal economic relations can flourish.
The US formula for economic and military preeminence Is unique. Direct 
political controls were eschewed In favor of a relatively liberal trading 
system with multilateral trade arrangements If not the elimination of tariffs, 
and access by US and West European multinational corporations to foreign mar­
kets. The absence of direct political controls meant that the US did not re­
present a threat to the territorial Integrity of small states, while economic 
penetration gave access to these countries1 resources and politics.
Economic Instruments and Context
Economic power has unique properties with respect to the third category, 
context, which require additional explanation. The first point Is that the 
economic instruments of power are least dependent on context of all che other 
elements, and this is due to the social institution of money, and the various 
degrees of relative ease with which other economic Instruments of power be­
sides money can be converted to it. This property of the Instruments of 
economic power Is called fungiblllty. Without money, there would be a barter 
economy# and an example stating that cloth cannot be eaten and wheat cannot be 
worn could have been substituted for the Rouble example above. The institution 
of money enables a country to trade one for the other more easily. The second
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point is that the fungibility of the economic instruments of power is circum­
scribed by market institutions.
The instruments of economic power can be classified into three categories: 
money, the means of production, and natural resources. Land and geography 
should also be included here, although they can be subsumed under the latter 
two categories. These instruments are commonly referred to as wealth. There 
is no need to join the debate over whether the mercantilists confused money 
with wealth. Real wealth obviously consists of the means of production, 
natural resources, and unconsumed goods. Money, however, represents a claim 
on wealth. Equally, important, it serves as a "link between the present and 
the f u t u r e . P a u l  Davidson calls it a "one-way machine."^ Therefore, it 
must be classified as wealth. Money and the means of production may also be 
considered as market institutions in their own right, but here the> will be 
separated analytically from the institution category of power, by treating 
the three Instruments of economic power as the object of regulation by market 
institutions. To an ordinary peracn uneducated in the intricacies of econ­
omic theory, it is self-evident that a person or country who possesses more 
money or more means of production has economic power. Money commands re­
sources, and the more a country has, the more resources it can command on 
world markets. This is obvious to all but the discipline if conventional 
economics, where power is assumed not to exist; the invisible hand of the
market ensures Pareto optimality.
. •
Institution, are also provide important means to influence economic out­
comes or be influenced by larger countries. Susan 8trange delineates four 
levels at which economic power is exercised in the international system.
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Firsti the structure of demand and consumption and other decisions made in 
the rich economies determine world patterns of investment,trade, production, 
and consumption. Second, governments after bargaining erect a framework of 
"minimum rules for the maintenance of stability and order." These include the 
IMF, Gatt, etc. The largest and most economically powerful states are the 
most influential in this process. Third, is "the formulation of national 
rules governing access to factors of production, credit and markets, and 
other fundamental questions affecting economic enterprise and economic trans­
actions. As before, the national government with the largest domestic market 
and which is the home state for the largest number of multinational enter­
prises responsible for global strategies of production will exercise the 
greatest economic power." Fourth, "economic power is exercised at the oper­
ational level on both sides of every actual economic transaction, by buyers 
and sellers, creditors and debtors."^®
It is important to note that adoption of this mercantilistlc 
outlook on power and wealth does not necessitate the adoption of the tra­
ditional mercantilist policy tools. A liberal trading policy is effective in 
advancing the interests of the more powerful states. Moreover, countries have 
developed other tools besides the old crude methods of tariffs and quotas to 
maintain competitiveness and minimise trade adjustment problems. Also this 
does not mean lalaees fairs* Hors effective policy tools include silective 
tax breaks, government subsidies to research, infrastructure, and selected 
industries, patent laws, and monstary and fiscal policy.
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Conclusion
What then, can be concluded about the relative importance of wealth and 
power for the nation-state? The thesis of Paul Kennedy's recent work implies 
an economic determinism: "there exists a dynamic for change, driven chiefly
by economic and technological developments, which then impact upon social 
structures, political systems, military power, and the position of individual 
states and empires." This dynamic is driven by economics: "all of the major
shifts in the world's military-power balances have followed alterations in 
the productive balances; • • • [in] the major Great Power wars, • • • victory 
hrs always gone to the side with the greatest material r e s o u r c e s T h e  con­
ventional wisdom, in contrast, tends to "treat military power resources as 
the 'ultimate' power base."50 The mercantilist position that wealth is abso­
lutely essential to political-military power and that political-military power 
is essential to get w mith still seems to be the best conclusion.
Certainly wealth as a form of power is a unique because of its high de­
gree of fungibility. It is the source of most other forms of power. Military 
equipment and personnel cannot be obtained without it, a large population can­
not be sustained without it. It provides a basis for economic sanctions, and 
enables wars to be financed. More wealth leads to greater domestic political 
stability. Moreover, aside from population, it is the only form of power that 
can reproduce itself. It is the fountain of economic growth and technological 
advance•
Yet military power is also unique because of its unparalleled capacity 
for coercion tLat economic power is not capable of attaining. The smooth
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operation of any trading system, whether It be the Internal market of a rel­
atively self-sufficient bloc as Japan tried to be before World War II or 
the liberal trading system of the postwar period requires some political 
equilibrium or loose hegemony In the International system or military protec­
tion of the self-sufficient state or liberal trading system. The trading 
fortunes of Japan and Europe were made possible by the military might of 
the pax Americana.
The answer is that both military and economic components of power are 
necessary to adequately maintain a state's interests. A state unable to 
command much military power on its own will be forced to associate with a state 
which is able to provide a military umbrella, as are Europe and Japan. The 
stronger countries able to command more of the military instruments of power 
must carefully watch international circumstances to maintain the proper 
balance. It is theoretically within the realm of possibility that a trading 
world that Rosecrance envisions may someday come about, but it is hard to 
imagine this without postulating so&e overarching political force that in­
hibits territorial or political rivalry, much as a national police force main­
tains domestic order and prevents the domestic polity from degenerating into a 
Hobbeslan state of nature which still lies beneath the surface of the regimes, 
institutions and structures painstakingly agreed upon by nations or regulate 
certain areas of their affairs. The state of nature will never be entirely 
gone until national sovereignty is replaced by a central authority.
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APPENDIX:
ECONOMIC POWER AND THE PURSUIT OF ECONOMIC GOALS
The contextual analysis of military power has been studied extensively 
by military strategists who answer the question of what kinds of military 
power are useful in which situations. This kind cf contextual perspective 
for economic power is lacking, in large part because economists have long re­
jected the idea that power is present in economics. This appendix is in­
tended to make a start at filling that gap.
1. Economic Instruments of Power
The instruments of economic power can he classified into three categories: 
money, the means of production, and natural resources. Land and geography 
should also be included here, although they can be subsumed under the latter 
two categories. These Instruments are commonly referred to as wealth. There 
is no need to join the debate over whether the mercantilists confused money 
with wealth. Real wealth obviously consists of the means of production, nat- 
ural resources, and unconsumed goods. Money, however, represents a claim on 
wealth. Equally, Important, it serves as a "link between the present and 
the future."51 Paul Davidson calls it a "one-way time machine."52 There­
fore, it must be classified as wealth. Money and the means of production 
may also be considered as market institutions in their own right, but here 
they will be separated analytically from the institution category of power, 
by treating the three Instruments of economic power as the object of regula­
tion by market institutions.
2. Beginnings of a Market System
The mere commencement of a market results in change In distribution of 
power. The transition from feudalism is a classic example. Under feudalism» 
the barons had the largest share of economic power. They controlled the pri­
mary means of production, land and serfs. The serfs were bound to them by 
law. These economic parameters could not be changed [short of a political 
revolution] except by the barons and the king. With widespread use of money 
and establishment of the market and wage labor, [along with political revolu­
tion] the economic power of the barons was crushed. The natural historical 
tendency is for economics and wealth to be regulated by coercive power. The 
advent of the liberal system saw the bourgeoisie classes gaining control of 
the coercive instruments of the state. They instituted free markets and wage 
labor in order to undermine the economic and political power that remained 
to the feudal classes, and to enhance their own control.
The nature of economic power relationships i.i one cense is fundamen­
tally different in market economies and non-market economies. Bconomlc con­
trol is more direct, immediate, and coercive in non-market economies, but 
these types of systems are difficult to extend without coercive power. The 
market, on the other hand, greatly expands the extent of influence. Through 
it, events in the US can directly affect events all over the world, a feat 
which would not be possible under a non-market economy. Economic changes in 
the Soviet Union, in contrast, have negligible effect on the rest of the world 
economy* Yet market power is much more indirect and diffuse; it la difficult 
and costly for political authorities to impose their will by flat* For the 
dominant economic power, the market provides a means to widen the extent of
influence by sacrificing immediacy of control.
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3. Power Within the Market
General
One of the simplest manifestations of economic potter is the fact that 
the nation or multinational corporation with more money or resources to trade 
will be able to command more goods on the international market. A business 
with more money has more power. As Susan Strange puts It, ’’the wealthiest 
consumers exercise the most •votes’ in > market economy."^ The ability to 
purchase a good or service represents Influence over an outcome. If there is 
a limited quantity of * product at a given time, the entity with more money 
will be able to pruchase more by offering a higher price. Although this ex­
ample of economic power is probably the most obvious, it is also the one that 
many economists would object to, because it so clearly strikes at the notion 
that the market ensures a natural harmony of Interests. Yet the fact remains 
that the entity with more money will have a higher budget line which will be 
tangent to a higher Indifference curve, and will therefore have more utility 
than the entity with less money and a lower budget line. The power element 
becomes clearer as the object of purchase becomes more important for other ob­
jectives. While arms transfers are usually dependent more on strategic con­
siderations and a poor country may receive arms gratis due to its strategic 
position, a country with more money, a better foreign exchange position, has a 
much easier time finding armaments. Oil is perhaps a better example. Small 
African countries with few opportunities for exports and therefore little 
foreign exchange, had a much gore difficult time purchasing oil during the 
crises of the 19?09s than the industrialised Western countries. This 
does not mean the small African countries had no power; certainly they had a
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small amount of foreign exchange or could borrow some, and could purchase some 
oil. Yet, their ability to affect the outcome, the purchase of oil, was 
vastly smaller than that of the industrialized West. In sum, Inequality im­
plies power.
Elasticities of demand and supply also affect the outcome or goal which 
is called price. To the extent that a country's demand for a product is 
elastic or can be made more elastic, it will gain a better price and more 
control over outcomes.
The ability of an economy to adapt technologically and organizationally 
will give it the ability to alter elasticities of supply and demand, and even 
change the position of the supply and demand curves. For example, the indus­
trialized West has a greater ability to respond to reductions in oil supplies 
by switching to substitutes or innovating new oil-saving methods of produc­
tion. Less developed countries are very restricted in this ability. Coun­
tries whose businesses are more able to adapt and who are better able to 
generate and use new technologies have economic power, because these technol­
ogies can alter supply and demand, and therefore price, which is an outcome. 
Caves and Jones demonstrate that if demand elasticities for a country's export 
product are very low, growth biased toward the nation's export industry could 
reduce real Income by worsening the terms of trade.5* This instrument of 
economic power can also be described as the ability to alter production func­
tions through technological and organisational advance. Moreover, influence 
over the direction of change of production functions is held mostly by Western 
multinational corporations, A small developing country that wanted a multina* 
tlonal corporation but with a different production function [perhaps one using
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a greater proportion of labor] would have to bargain with It. The outcome* 
again* would depend on each parties use of the economic Instruments of power.
The corporation could exercise Its freedom to abandon the attempted transac­
tion, as could the prospective host country. Or the country could offer 
economic Inducements. The corporation may be weak In that It has a need for 
markets.
The optimum tariff Is another example of economic power. Under certain 
circumstances* the terms of trade effect of a tariff may be greater than Im­
port demand effect* raising the home country welfare. This may be negated by 
retaliation by the foreign country. Yet we have an example of an economic 
goal, increased welfare, being fought by alteration of the market structure* 
and the winner will be the one that can bring the most economic power re­
sources to bear.
In a market system where private banks supply a large portion of finan­
cial capital* an entity's ability to gain access to this capital depends on 
its wealth. A country with more wealth or prospective wealth [money or pro­
ductive resources] will be able to borrow more than a country with less 
wealth. Brazil and Mexico could borrow more money than Mozambique or Bangladesh. 
The US can borrow more money than any other country*
Externalities are another instance of the exercise of economic power. 
Transactions made within the US have resulted in acid rain that falls on Canada. 
This reduces Canada's welfare, bat increases the welfare of those who bene­
fit from the transactions that caused the acid rain. Canada has had diffi­
culty in marshalling enough economic $over resources to force the US to bear
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a greater share of the costs. US producers have so far been able to control 
the outcome because of their superior economic power.
Historical
Analytically, there are two ways for a country to increase relative share 
of world wealth. The first is to Increase its own growth rate above that 
of the other countries. The second is to decrease the growth rate of others. 
The second strategy may have been appropriate in the mercantilist period of the 
Seventeenth century, which witnesses the Anglo-Dutch and Anglo-French trade 
wars. It is no longer appropriate in the late Twentieth century. It is clear 
that deliberate beggar-'thy-neighbor policies reducing growth in the foreign 
economy, whether or not they succeed in reducing the relative world GNP share 
of the foreign country, will result in absolute reductions in home welfare. 
Reductions in home welfare will result in domestic political instability and 
possibly the fall of the sitting government or regime. It is much safer to 
pursue the first strategy.
By this analysis, the US is the country with the most economic power.
In 1986, the US share of world GNP was 24.7X.55 in 1980, the US share of 
world manufacturing production was 31.5%.56 it is Interesting to note that 
the US reached this position from a very low starting point. The US began 
with .XX world manufacturing production in 1750 and went to 44.8X in 1953. 
Britain started out at 1.9X in 1750 and went to 22.9X in 1880.57 Bairoch's 
data also show that many of the ten leading countries in terms of total man­
ufacturing output in 1880 were still on the top ten list In 1980.58 Less 
developed countries did Increase their share of world GNP from 1960 to 1980,
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but only from 11.1 to 14.8 percent. ^
The common thesis uniting the various versions of Dependency theory Is 
that somehow, the metropolitan countries regarded the development of the non- 
Western countries. This retardation is held to be due to the exercise of 
economic power by the metropolitan countries. Others deny the operation of 
power factors by pointing to the extensive growth that has taken place in 
the underdeveloped world. The East Asian NIC's are held to be a serious 
challenge to the dependency thesis.
With our new framework for analyzing economic power, we can see that 
there is an element of truth in both arguments, but neither provides a full 
explanation. In the domestic sphere, there exists a government authority 
with the ability to regulate market mechanisms in order to combat the problem 
of monopoly. Without action by such an authority, Marx's prediction that com­
petition would eliminate all but the most efficient firms and culminate in 
monopoly would have been proved true, especially in the US bafore the enact­
ment of the antitrust laws. No such authority exists in the international 
spher to prevent economic domination of the world economy by one or a few 
large countries. "Trust-Busting," if it is to be done at all, must be a joint 
and usually military effort of the threatened countries. Britain's coalition 
against Napoleon and the US-led coalitions against German and Japan b t p else-  ^
sic examples. No group of powers has been able to form a successful coa* cion 
against the US.
It seems, therefore, that somehow Britain, the US, and Europe gained an 
Initial competitive advantage by being the first to industrialise. Various
explanations have been put forth to answer the question of why these countries 
were first, and they need not detain us here. In principle, there is no rea­
son why the industrial revolution could not have happened somewhere else, had 
non-Western societies been more oriented to science, had different social or 
political structures, invented more products and processes, or possessed some 
of the other qualities whose absence destined the industrial revolution to 
start in the West. The fact is, the West gained an initial competitive advan­
tage and was able to keep it. The US share of world manufacturing production 
went ;rom .1% in 1750 to 44.8% in 1953, while the share of India-Pakistan fell 
from 24.5% in 1750 to 1.4% in 1913,60 although it then rose to 2.3% in 1980.61 
Certainly the growth rate of India and other developing countries has been 
relatively high in recent years. Between 1965 and 1973, India's average 
annual growth rate was 3.9% and between 1973-1983 it was 4 .0%.62
The non-Western countries probably would not have been better off had 
they stayed out of the international market economy. To the extent that social 
and political factors were responsible for the non-Western failure to indus­
trialize first, it is unlikely that they would have begun the process of in­
dustrialization earlier had they been able to opt out of the international 
market economy set up by European imperialism.
An analogy can be made at the level of the individual. In primitive 
societies, the introduction of money and a market economy based on a divi­
sion of labor will destroy the self-sufficiency of subsistence agriculture. 
Governments in developing countries, in the name of "economic development," 
will take measures to convert the subsistence economy to a market economy.
The object is to enhance national power by Increasing the resources under
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state control. Labor freed from the subsistence economy Is more easily con­
trolled » and It provides new sources of tax revenue and a larger pool of mil­
itary draftees for the central government. Control of the peasants by making 
them dependent on markets Is much easier than relying on coercion* or agree­
ments with tribal chiefs that would dilute the central government's power. 
Nyerere's policy of vlllaglzatlon In Tanzania Is a good example of this. The 
policy was resisted by the peasants who rightly saw that dependence on the 
market would remove the economic security provided by subsistence farming.63 
On the other hand* once people are brought Into a market economy* some will be 
successful In advancing their own economic power through the new system. In 
less developed countries* a new middle class can quickly emerge and become a 
source of political instability* as it did in the case of Iran.
The same argument holds true in the international system. A policy of 
autarky would not* In all likelihood* have advanced the prospects of the less 
developed countries. They may have been able to retain a degree of economic 
Independence and self-sufficiency for a time. Military power* however* was 
rapidly becoming a function of Industrialization. Any country which did not 
industrialize would have been vulnerable to military pressure* and Indeed* this 
was the fate of Africa in the late Nineteenth century. The non-Western coun­
tries really had no choice but to participate in the international market 
economy after decolonization. Otherwise* they never would have a chance of 
catching up to the West in terms of the share of world wealth and economic 
power. Indeed* they have made progress as illustrated above* but the developed 
countries still produce over 80% of world GNP and manufactures.
4. Power and Market Structures and Institutions
Property Rights
Property Rights are one of the most ubiquitous manifestations of econ­
omic power in domestic society. Indeed* a market economy would be impossible 
without property rights. Sovereignty is the International equivalent of 
property rights in the international system* although it can only be enforced 
through coercive power or by the help of another sovereign country which 
backs it by its coercive power.
Sovereignty and Geography
Sovereignty is defined over territory. The accidents of geography 
ensure that some countries gain more economic advantages from their peculiar 
territorial circumstances than other countries. These accidents of geography 
give these countries more control over economic outcomes* Panama* for example 
benefits from the revenue of the Panama Canal* and Egypt benefits from the 
revenue of the Suez Canal. Countries have different endowments of natural 
resources* which in turn give them varying degrees of advantage on interna­
tional markets. The oil exporting countries were able to exercise this power 
to a remarkable degree in the 1970's. Saudi Arabia* by virtue of its large 
share of OPEC oil reserves and productive capacity* used this instrument of 
economic power to Induce OPEC to moderate its price and production policy* 
because it saw this to be in its own economic interests.
Access to Internal Markets
Regulation of foreign access to internal markets is another instrument 
of economic power conferred by sovereignty* Suean Strange contends that "the
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rules made by the United States —  and made in response for the most part to 
domestic political pressures and domestic economic and social needs —  are 
almost always much the most important set of national rules affecting opera­
tors in international markets."^ She cites "interest-rate policies pursued 
by the Federal Reserve Board, . . . air transport rulings given by the Civil 
Aeronautics Board, . • . stock market regulations enforce by the Securities 
Exchange Commission," and US anti-trust laws*65 The fact that the US repre­
sents fully one-third of the world's industrial markets gives it a great deal 
of economic bargaining power.66 A perceived need to gain a foothold in the 
US market was a major motivation by the premium offer made by the Japanese 
corporation Bridgestone for Firestone.67 The Wall Street Journal quotes 
Donald Straszhelm, president of Merrill Lynch Economics as saying, "Basically 
anybody in any Industry has to be a player in the United States if they want to 
be a big player in the world."6® The ten largest Japanese acquisitions and in­
vestments in the US since 1987 total $8.1 billion.69 The economic power en­
abling the Japanese to do this stems from "wealth generated by years of massive 
trade surpluses and a strong currency," and "the unique structure of Japanese 
industry that combines huge industrial firms in close alliances with major 
banks."7®
Money
Money has always been one of the most Important economic institutions 
in the international economy. Its form and regulation have far reaching ef­
fects on the level of world economic activity and the distribution of wealth.
When precious metals were the form of money used in international trade,
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the countries which controlled the greatest share of mines possessed a lever 
of economic power with which to affect economic outcomes not possessed by other 
countries. Spain and Portugal during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth centuries 
effectively determined the Western world's monev upply because of their access 
to sources in Asia and America. Undoubtedly thi ar^e influx of gold was in 
large part responsible for the Inflation of that period* and that a large part 
of the gold was used in unproductive wars. Yet fighting a war can be repre­
sented as a want on an community indifference curve* and economists are loathe 
to criticize cigarettes or other frivolous patterns of consumption as irra­
tionals cigarettes are calculated in. the GNP. Since in the evaluation of the 
benefits from trade economists usually discount the fact that a change In the 
distribution of income will change the position of the community Indifference 
curve* we can also discount it here and treat the Habsburg community indiff­
erence curve as given. Keeping this in mind* these gold inflows contributed 
significantly to Habsburg utility [military power]. "In the Lepanto campaign 
[1571]* it was reckoned that the maintenance of the Christian fleets and 
soldiers would cost over 4 million ducats annually." The "Income from American 
mines —  around 2 million ducats a year by the 1580s compared with one-tenth 
of that four decades earlier —  rescued the crown's finances* and credit* tem­
porarily; but the armada of 1588 coat 10 million ducats and its sad fate re-
71
presented a financial as well as a naval disaster." Without access to the 
supply of gold* the Habeburg would never have been able to purchase as many 
goods and services [soldiers* sailors* and military equipment) that they did* 
and their utility [as indicated by their revealed preference] would have been 
lower.
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Over time, bills of exchange began to displace bullion as the main form 
of International currency, and Amsterdam was the center of much of this activ­
ity. The "financial revolution" in England, encompassing the establishment 
of the Bank of England and the transference of responsibility for public debt 
from the crown to Parliament, enabled the English government to have much 
easier access to the Amsterdam capital markets than any other foreign govern­
ments, especially the French. The British could get loans at relatively low 
interest rates. This financial advantage made a critical contribution to the 
British war efforts against France in the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth 
century.^ Britain's superior financial organization was a critical contribution 
to its economic power that enabled it to control outcomes (achieve goals, en­
hance utility by purchasing goods and services needed for the prosecution 
of war] better than the French.
The position of a country's currency may confer it special advantages 
or disadvantages. Susan Strange has classified currencies into four categories! 
master currency, top currency, negotiated currency, and a neutral currency.
A master currency "occurs when an imperial or hegemonial state Imposes the use 
of its currency on other political entities, whether they are allied states, 
dependent protectorates, or colonies,"73 a  top currency is the "favorite for 
international monetary transactions, most often and most widely used for a 
great variety of monetary purposes; it is the favorite of the world market." 
Although political factors me;* be important, "the deciding factor, compelling 
confidence in the use of a Top Currency, is necessarily economic."7* The <
dollar in the first 12 or 15 years after World War It is an example of this
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to persuade all the countries of Western Europe, of Central and South America 
and of the Afro-Aslan bloc outside the sterling area and franc zone to hold 
dollars or to accept them without question as a means of p a y m e n t a 
negotiated currency, In contrast, Is "characterized by the need of the Issuing 
state to bargain or negotiate diplomatically with the users about the terms 
and conditions of Its use," and Is usually a master currency or top currency 
on the decline.76 Sterling In the postwar period and the dollar since the 
1960vs are current examples. The main distinction of a negotiated currency 
Is that the issuing state must Issue inducements for others to hold It as a 
reserve currency.?? Neutral Currencies "originate In the strong economic 
position of the Issuing state."78 These curencles are used widely In Inter** 
national transactions and held often as private reserve currencies, but the 
Issuing government does not offer special Inducements for other countries 
to hold It as a reserve currency. Strange cities Swlssfrancs and German 
Marks as examples; were she writing her book today, she would probably also 
Include the Yen. Strange adds a caveat that "the reader will have remarked 
that In this classification neither the dollar nor sterling comes exclusively 
into one category of international currencies. The dollar is a Neutral Cur­
rency, especially in its Eurodollar form, and to a lesser degree so Is ster­
ling in the form of Eurosterling. The dollar is also a Negotiated Currency 
in the outer dollar area where military, financial, and broad economic bene­
fits aid and preference are offered to governments holding dollars as an im­
portant part of their monetary reserves
The country whose currency is held by other countries as a reserve cur- 
rency also gains special economic advantages and disadvantages. The
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disadvantage is that It may be difficult to exercise control over the use of 
foreigners of their reserves, which may have adverse effects on the home 
economy. This was especially true of Britain, whose small sire in relation 
to the rest of the world detracted from its ability to influence outcomes 
[economic power]. In the large country case, however, the reserve currency 
country can use its status to reduce the need for adjustment or avoid it com­
pletely. The US seemingly has the power to continue its balance of payments 
deficits indefinitely. DeGaulle claimed that the US abuse of its reserve cur-* 
rency status was exporting inflation to Europe. Moreover, US deficits were 
seen as involuntary loans financing the expansion of US overseas business.8® 
The power of the US in the IMF limited the creation of additional liquidity 
through SDRs. David Callao's interpretation is that "the US was not running 
deficits to provide liquidity to others, but as a byproduct of pursuing its 
domestic and foreign ambitions. As long as the United States held the mone­
tary hegemony involved in the reserve currency role, it could be certain that 
ample liquidity would be available to finance its foreign positions. Though 
the United States was quite happy to use the IMF as a gloss over its monetary 
hegemony, it had no intention of ceding its real power over the world money 
supply.,#®1 The US had the power to determine the continuance of the gold- 
exchange standard, since its currency was the standard. The Europeans were 
powerless to atop the US from abandoning the standard. The dollar was de­
valued, and the value of the reserves hold by European and other central banks 
was immediately depreciated. The US definitely had the greater ability to 
achieve its goals and control outcomes from the Europeans in this situation.
Historical precedent and the relative else of the US economy ensured that
*
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the dollar retained a central role in the subsequent period of floating ex­
change rates.
The IMF in regulating the worlds monetary and payments system reflects 
the power wielded by the US and West Europe. This is one of the most critical 
market institutions in the international economy. ,fThe Fund is controlled by 
its member states in proportion to the size of their quotas. It is thus ruled 
firmly by the rich countries.1,02 Quotas were set by the founding agreement# 
and adjustments in quotas require an BOX majority. Since the US has a quota 
of 23% [in 1974].03 It has a veto over quota adjustment. US leadership has 
ensured that the burden of adjustment falls on debtors, not creditors. The 
role of it8 currency, however, means that the US has so far been exempt in 
recent times with its new status as a debtor.
GATT
Here, we find a lacking In economic power for the countries that are non 
members, like the East Bloc# They are not able to gain advantages accruing 
from MFH status. Until recently, however, this has been a matter of policy 
by the Soviet Union and its East Bloc allies, who saw greater advantages in an 
autarkic system#
Multinational Firms
Sometimes it Is groups of large multinational firms rather than govern­
ments which regulate access to markets# MIn quite a few International markets 
the most Important rules regarding access, whether to resources or to markets, 
will be those mad# by a cartel or informally worked out within a small
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oligopolistic group of large multinational enterprises —  like aluminum com­
panies, for example. The objections raised in UNCTAD against the political 
framework around the International shipping business are directed not 
against an intergovernmental body, or against any national government , but 
against the shipping conferences of the operators.84
Policy Instruments
Keynsian and other macroeconomic models such as IS-LM-FE designed to ex­
plain the balance of payments, interest rates, and output enbody economic 
power, although it is not usually recognized as such. These types of models 
are often used to analyze the effect of fiscal policy, monetary policy, cap­
ital mobility, and flexibility of exchange rates on other macro variables.
The use of these policy instruments will have effects on Inflation, employment, 
the distribution of Income, and other economic outcomes, therefore they can 
be classified as instruments of power. In the large country case, their use 
will have effects on the economies of other countries.
Conclusion
We can now examine some of the common neoclassical observations about the 
nature of market economy. First is the princple that the market economy is 
based on choice and consumer sovereignty. This is true enough as far as it 
goes, but it should be clear by now that the ability to choose is dependent 
on economic power! share of wealth, ownership of the means of production, 
and ability to influence markec structures. The problem of scarcity combined 
with inequalities of influence over market structures ensures the existence 
of economic power. Moreover, conventional economics takes the market system 
as given. While this may be desirable ideologically in order to prevent 
people from thinking about alternatives, this assumption is analytically in­
valid.
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